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Abstract— In this paper, distributed energy management
of interconnected microgrids, which is stated as a dynamic
economic dispatch problem, is studied. Since the distributed
approach requires cooperation of all local controllers, when
some of them do not comply with the distributed algorithm that
is applied to the system, the performance of the system might
be compromised. Specifically, it is considered that adversarial
agents (microgrids) might implement control inputs that are
different than the ones obtained from the distributed algorithm.
By performing such behavior, these agents might have better
performance at the expense of deteriorating the performance
of the regular agents. This paper proposes a methodology
to deal with this type of adversarial agents such that we
can still guarantee that the regular agents can still obtain
feasible, though suboptimal, control inputs in the presence of
adversarial behaviors. The methodology consists of two steps:
(i) the robustification of the underlying optimization problem
and (ii) the identification of adversarial agents, which uses
hypothesis testing with Bayesian inference and requires to solve
a local mixed-integer optimization problem. Furthermore, the
proposed methodology also prevents the regular agents to be
affected by the adversaries once the adversarial agents are
identified.
Index Terms— Economic dispatch, distributed MPC, dis-
tributed optimization, resilient algorithm
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to face the increasing penetration of distributed
generation units, either dispatchable or non-dispatchable
ones, and energy storages, such as batteries, supercapacitors,
and fuel cells, in electrical networks, distributed approaches
for energy management system currently gain a lot of
attention, e.g., as discussed in [1]–[4]. The advantages of
employing a distributed approach for this task include avoid-
ing significant increase of information, communication, and
modeling resources used for a centralized dispatch as well
as distributing high computational burden [1].
In a distributed scheme, a distribution electrical network
can be viewed as a system of interconnected microgrids [1],
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[5], each of which is a controllable entity that has its own
local controller. Therefore, the economic dispatch problem of
the network must be decomposed and assigned to the local
controllers. A distributed optimization approach can then be
formulated and applied to solve the problem. In this regard,
Model Predictive Control (MPC) strategy, with receding
horizon principle, is suitable, particularly when the dynamics
of the storages are considered, since the decisions/control
inputs are always updated at each sampling time according
to the measurement of the states. Distributed MPC (DMPC)
methods that have been proposed to solve economic dispatch
problems include those that are based on dual decomposition
[4], alternating direction method of multipliers [2], optimality
condition decomposition [3] and population dynamics [6].
These approaches are suitable since they obtain an optimal
solution if the related optimization problem is convex.
One of the important features in such distributed ap-
proaches is the cooperation of the agents to apply the
algorithm and to comply with the decisions obtained from
the distributed algorithm. In this work, we deal with the
problem of agent compliance, in which some of the agents
do not always implement the decision obtained from the dis-
tributed algorithm. Instead, they may implement a different
decision that is more beneficial for them but compromise
the performance of the other agents and hence the entire
system. Agents with such adversarial behaviors are identified
in [7] as liar agents or in [8] as misbehaving agents.
The authors of [7] propose a secure dual-decomposition-
based DMPC, in which the agents that provide extreme
control input values are monitored and disregarded, to deal
with this issue. Furthermore, [8] addresses a cyber-attack
problem of a consensus-based distributed control scheme for
distributed energy storage systems. The proposed approach
in [8] includes a fuzzy-logic-based detection and a consensus
based leader-follower distributed control scheme.
The contributions of this paper is as follows. We study the
impact of an adversarial behavior in the distributed energy
management system that is based on a DMPC scheme and
propose to actively use the storage system and the possibility
to establish/disestablish connections between agents to deal
with this behavior. To this end, we propose an approach that
consists of two main steps. The first step is the robustification
of the economic dispatch problem. By considering the robust
reformulation, we ensure that the regular agents always
obtain a solution that satisfies all the constraints defined
in the economic dispatch problem even though there are
some agents that do not comply with the decisions. In the
second step, we propose an active strategy to identify the
adversarial agents that is based on hypothesis testing using
Bayesian inference (e.g., [9]). In this method, each regular
agent must solve a local mixed-integer problem to decide
the connections with its neighbors at each time instant.
By actively connecting/disconnecting with neighbors, regular
agents can then assess their hypothesis.
Notations: The set of real numbers and integers are
denoted by R and Z, respectively. Moreover, R≥a denotes
all real numbers in the set {b : b ≥ a, b, a ∈ R}. A similar
definition can be used for Z≥a and the strict inequality
case. For column vectors vi with i ∈ L = {l1, . . . , l|L|},
the operator [v>i ]
>
i∈L denotes the column-wise concatenation,
i.e., [v>i ]
>
i∈L = [v
>
l1
, · · · , v>l|L| ]>. The vector 1n denotes
[1 1 · · · 1]> ∈ Rn. The set cardinality and Euclidean
norm are denoted by |·| and ‖·‖2. Furthermore, P(·) denotes
the probability measure. Finally, discrete-time instants are
denoted by the subscript k.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION & DISTRIBUTED APPROACH
A. Dynamic Economic Dispatch Problem
Consider a network of interconnected microgrids, which
can be represented as an undirected graph S = (N , E),
where N = {1, 2, . . . , |N |} denotes the set of microgrids
and E ⊆ N ×N denotes the set of physical links among the
microgrids. In this regard, the link (i, j) ∈ E implies that
it is possible to exchange energy between microgrids i and
j. Furthermore, denote the set of neighbors of microgrid i
by Ni, i.e., Ni = {j : (i, j) ∈ E}. Each microgrid i ∈ N
consists of an aggregated local load, denoted by pdi,k ∈ R≥0,
a set of dispatchable distributed generators, denoted by Gi,
and a storage system from which electrical energy can be
stored and retrieved. Each microgrid can also obtain power
by buying it from the main grid. In this economic dispatch
problem, optimal power generation of the generators and
storage usage are sought by considering their economical
costs such that the loads are satisfied. Additionally, pdi,k is
assumed to be bounded as follows:
|pdi,k − pˆdi,k|≤ dmaxi , (1)
where pˆdi,k, d
max
i ∈ R≥0 denote the forecast and the upper
bound, respectively, which are assumed to be known a priori.
The power balance equations for each microgrid i ∈ N at
each time instant k ∈ Z≥0 are as follows [2], [3]:
pˆdi,k − pGi,k − psti,k − pimi,k −
∑
j∈Ni
ptji,k = 0, (2)
ptij,k + p
t
ji,k = 0, ∀j ∈ Ni, (3)
where pGi,k =
∑
m∈Gi p
g
m,k ∈ R≥0 denotes the total power
generation in microgrid i, with pgm,k being the power gen-
eration of distributed generator m; psti,k ∈ R, pimi,k ∈ R≥0,
and ptji,k ∈ R denote the power delivered by or to the
storage, the imported power from the main grid, and the
power flows between microgrids i and j ∈ Ni, respectively.
Furthermore, (3) ensures that there is an agreement between
two neighboring microgrids in terms of the power exchanged
between them.
The dynamics of the storage system, for each i ∈ N , is
represented as follows:
xi,k+1 = aixi,k + bip
st
i,k, (4)
where xi,k denotes the state-of-charge (SoC) of storage i,
ai ∈ (0, 1] denotes the the efficiency of the storage and
bi = − Tsecap,i , where Ts and ecap,i denote the sampling
time and the maximum capacity of the storage, respectively.
Additionally, for each microgrid i ∈ N , some local
operational constraints are also considered as follows:
xmini ≤ xi,k ≤ xmaxi , (5)
−pchi ≤ psti,k ≤ pdhi , (6)
pG,mini ≤ pGi,k ≤ pG,maxi , (7)
pimi,k ≤ pim,maxi (8)
−pt,maxji ≤ ptji,k ≤ pt,maxji , ∀j ∈ Ni, (9)
where xmini , x
max
i ∈ R≥0 denote the minimum and the
maximum SoC of the storage of microgrid i, respectively.
Moreover, pchi ∈ R≥0 and pdhi ∈ R≥0 denote the maximum
charging and discharging power of the storage. Further-
more, pG,mini , p
G,max
i ∈ R≥0 denote the minimum and the
maximum power generated by the distributed generators
of microgrid i, respectively, pim,maxi denotes the maximum
imported power from the main grid, and pt,maxji denotes the
maximum energy that can be transferred between microgrid
i and j.
Now, denote the control input vector of microgrid i
by ui = [psti,k p
G
i,k p
im
i,k u
c>
i,k ]
> ∈ R3+|Ni|, where
uci,k = [p
t
ji,k]
>
j∈Ni is the vector of coupled control
input variables. We denote hp as the prediction horizon and
consider the quadratic cost function
Ji,k = u
>
i,kRiui,k, (10)
where Ri = diag([csti c
G
i c
im
i c
t
i1
>
|Ni|]) > 0, in which
csti , c
G
i , c
im
i , c
t
i ∈ R>0 denote the per-unit cost of storage
operation, producing energy, buying energy from the main
grid, and transferring energy to/from the neighbor due to
losses, respectively [2]. Thus, the finite-time optimization
problem that underlies an MPC strategy for the dynamic
economic dispatch of this system can be written as
minimize
{{ui,`|k}i∈N }k+hp−1`=k
∑
i∈N
k+hp−1∑
`=k
Ji,`(ui,`|k) (11a)
subject to Fiui,`|k ≤ fi,`, ∀i ∈ N , (11b)
uci,`|k +
∑
j∈Ni
Giju
c
j,`|k = 0, ∀i ∈ N , (11c)
for all ` ∈ {k, . . . , k + hp − 1}, where the local constraints
(11b) that only include local control inputs are constructed
from (2), (4)-(9), while the coupled constraints (11c) are
constructed from (3). Problem (11) is convex since the in-
equality constraints form a polyhedron, the coupled equality
constraints are affine, and the cost function (10) is strictly
convex. Furthermore, the following assumption, which is
related to the island mode, is considered.
Assumption 1: For Problem (11), there exists a nonempty
set of feasible solutions and it includes a subset in which
ptij,k = p
t
ji,k = 0, for any (i, j) ∈ E and k ∈ Z≥0. 2
Remark 1: Without loss of generality, pGi,k is considered
as one of the control input instead of pgm,k, for all m ∈ Gi.
Considering pgm,k, for all m ∈ Gi, is also straightforward and
only increases the dimension of ui. 2
B. Distributed Energy Management based on Dual Decom-
position
In general, many distributed optimization algorithm can be
applied as a DMPC strategy to solve Problem (11). However,
for the clarity of the explanation, a DMPC algorithm based
on dual decomposition is considered in this paper. In order
to design the mentioned algorithm, the Lagrangian function
associated to Problem (11) is derived and its dual problem
[10] is decomposed into smaller problems that are assigned
to the agents (microgrids). The DMPC strategy based on dual
decomposition is stated in Algorithm 1, where λi,` ∈ R|Ni|,
for all ` ∈ {k, . . . , k + hp − 1} and all i ∈ N , are the
Lagrange multipliers associated to the coupled constraints
(11c). Finally, denote the optimal decisions obtained by the
DMPC strategy for time k by u?i,k|k, for all i ∈ N .
Algorithm 1 DMPC algorithm based on dual decomposition,
for each agent i ∈ N
1: Set r = 1, ε ∈ R>0, and initialize λ(r)i,`
2: while
∣∣∣∣[ψ>i,k · · · ψ>i,k+hp−1]∣∣∣∣2 > ε do
3: Solve the local optimization problem:
minimize
{ui,`|k}k+hp−1`=k
k+hp−1∑
`=k
(
Ji,`(ui,`|k) + y>i,`u
c
i,`|k
)
subject to (11b), ∀` ∈ {k, . . . , k + hp − 1},
where y>i,` = λ
(r)>
i,` +
∑
j∈Ni λ
(r)>
j,` Gji
4: Update λi,` for all ` ∈ {k, . . . , k + hp − 1} as
λ
(r+1)
i,` = λ
(r)
i,` + γ
uci,`|k + ∑
j∈Ni
Giju
c
j,`|k
 ,
where 0 < γ < 1
5: r ← r + 1
6: end while
C. Adversary Model
The agents are classified as regular and adversarial agents
based on the following definitions.
Definition 1: Agent i belongs to the set of regular agents,
denoted by R, if it always implements its control input ui,k
according to the decision obtained from the DMPC strategy,
i.e., ui,k = u?i,k|k, for all k ≥ 0. Otherwise, agent i belongs
to the set of adversarial agents, denoted by A. 2
Definition 2: An attack is defined as the event at one time
instant when at least one adversarial agent implements its
control input that is different than the decision obtained from
the DMPC strategy. 2
Definition 3 ([11]): The set of adversarial agents is f -
local if |A ∩ Ni|≤ f , for f ∈ Z≥1 and all i ∈ N . 2
Assumption 2: Each agent has at most one adversarial
neighbor. 2
Assumption 3: Regular agents do not have prior knowl-
edge of the attack occurrences, but they have an expectation
on the attack probability, denoted by Pat ∈ (0, 1]. 2
In this paper, the case is restricted for f = 1, as stated
in Assumption 2. The adversarial agents may try to gain
advantage by implementing a different decision that benefits
these agents. For instance, the adversarial agents may get
benefit if they decide to reduce the energy production and/or
store more energy to their storages and ask their neighbors
to provide the power deficiency. Although it leads to a global
suboptimal solution, the adversarial agents gain an advantage
locally. In other words, the adversarial agents are not willing
to cooperate for their own interest.
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
A. Robustification Against Attacks
Regular agents might be affected negatively from the
attacks of their adversarial neighbors. Due to the coupled
constraints (3), regular agents must conform with the actions
taken by their adversarial neighbors. In this regard, the
existence of a storage unit at each microgrid could help
to mitigate this issue without affecting the operation of the
distributed generators. Additionally, uncertain loads might
have similar effect to all microgrids and we consider that
the deviation between the forecast and the actual load is
compensated by the storage units.
In order to meet the power balance (2) when an attack
occurs, more power from the storage (psti,k) is taken. How-
ever, it implies that the evolution of the SoC is different
than the one that is predicted by the dynamic model (4). To
ensure that there is no violation on the related constraints, a
formulation that robustifies Problem (11) against such attacks
as well as the uncertainty of the load is proposed. To this
end, we consider the attack as disturbance, denoted by wai,k,
and denote the load disturbance by wdi,k. These disturbances
affect the power balance (2) as follows:
pˆdi,k−pGi,k−psti,k−pimi,k−wdi,k−wai,k−
∑
j∈Ni
ptji,k = 0. (12)
Although wdi,k and w
a
i,k are uncertain, they are bounded by
(1) and (9), respectively. Therefore, agent i ∈ R might
consider the worst case of the total disturbance, denoted by
wi,k = w
a
i,k + w
d
i,k, which is stated as follows:
wmaxi,k = max
j∈Ni
(
2pt,maxji
)
+ dmaxi , (13)
due to (9) and Assumption 2. Since wi,k is compensated
by the power delivered by/to the storage psti,k, the constraints
related to psti,k, i.e., (5) and (6), might be violated. Therefore,
these constraints are tightened to accommodate the worst
case disturbance wmaxi,k as follows:
xmini − biwmaxi,k ≤ aixi,` + bipsti,` ≤ xmaxi + biwmaxi,k , (14)
−pchi + wmaxi,k ≤ psti,` ≤ pdhi − wmaxi,k , (15)
for all ` ∈ {k, . . . , k + hp − 1}. Hence, the robust reformu-
lation of Problem (11) is stated as follows:
minimize
{{ui,`|k}i∈N }k+hp−1`=k
∑
i∈N
k+hp−1∑
`=k
Ji,`(ui,`|k) (16a)
subject to F ri ui,`|k ≤ f ri,`, ∀i ∈ N , (16b)
uci,`|k +
∑
j∈Ni
Giju
c
j,`|k = 0, ∀i ∈ N , (16c)
for all ` ∈ {k, . . . , k + hp − 1}, where (16b) with the
appropriate F ri and f
r
i,` is defined according to (2), (4), (7)-
(9), and (13)-(15).
Proposition 1: Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Problem
(16) has feasible solutions if and only if
wmaxi,k ≤ min
(
1
2
(
pchi + p
dh
i
)
,− 1
2bi
(
xmaxi − xmini
))
.
(17)
Furthermore, suppose that both Assumption 2 and (17) hold.
Then, any feasible solution of Problem (16) does not violate
operational constraints (2)-(9) even though an attack, which
is defined in Definition 2, occurs. 2
Proof: The proof is provided in [12].
Assumption 4: Condition (17) holds true, implying the
existence of feasible solutions of Problem (16). 2
If the condition of wmaxi,k stated in Proposition 1 is not
satisfied, then pGi,k and/or p
im
i,k must also be involved in
compensating wi,k. In this regard, the constraints related to
pGi,k and p
im
i,k must be tightened with similar procedure as
that previously explained. For the remaining of the paper,
suppose that Assumption 4 holds. Therefore, the DMPC
method presented in Algorithm 1 can then be applied to solve
Problem (16) by simply substituting (11b) with (16b) in the
local optimization step.
B. Attack Identification and Mitigation
The attack identification and mitigation is an active de-
tection strategy, where regular agents test their hypothesis to
find their adversarial neighbors by deciding to open/close
their connections with their neighbors. Firstly, a regular
agent, i ∈ R, detects an attack performed by one of its
neighbors by evaluating its own SoC as follows:
∆i,k =
∣∣xi,k − (xi,k−1 + b>i u?i,k−1 + bipˆdi,k−1)∣∣ , (18)
where bi = bi[0 − 1>2+|Ni|]>. If ∆i,k > bidmaxi , then at k,
agent i detects an attack.
Remark 2: An attack wai,k such that |wai,k + wdi,k|≤ dmaxi
is undetectable since the regular agents cannot distinguish it
from the load disturbance. However, such an attack is toler-
able since the agents consider the bound of load disturbance
as dmaxi in the first place. 2
Although an attack can be detected, for |Ni|> 1, it is not
possible to determine which neighbor is the adversarial one
by only evaluating (18). Therefore, in order to identify the
adversarial neighbors, we apply a hypothesis testing method
that is based on Bayesian inference [9].
Each agent, i ∈ R, considers the following set of hy-
potheses, Hi = {H0i ,Hji : j ∈ Ni}, where the hypotheses
are defined as follows:
• H0i : There is no attack,
• Hji : Neighbor j is an adversarial agent,
for all j ∈ Ni. The Bayesian inference is used as the model
to update the probability of the hypotheses as follows:
Pk+1(Hji ) =
Pk(Hji )Pk(∆i,k|Hji )
Pk(∆i,k)
, (19)
for all Hji ∈ Hi, where Pk(Hji ) denotes the probability of
hypothesis Hji at time instant k, Pk(∆i,k) denotes the the
marginal likelihood of ∆i,k, and Pk(∆i,k|Hji ) denotes the
probability of observing ∆i,k given hypothesis H
j
i and is
formulated as follows:
Pk(∆i,k ≤ bidmaxi |Hji ) =
{
1, for j = 0,
1− vji,kPat, for all j ∈ Ni,
Pk(∆i,k > bidmaxi |Hji ) =
{
0, for j = 0,
vji,kPat, for all j ∈ Ni,
where vji,k ∈ {0, 1}, for all j ∈ Ni, denote the decision
whether agent i connects to and negotiates with neighbor j,
i.e., vji,k = 1 implies agent i connects to neighbor j, whereas
vji,k = 0 implies agent i does not connect to neighbor j. Note
that Pk+1(Hji ) is the a posteriori probability of H
j
i given
the event ∆i,k, i.e., Pk+1(Hji ) = P(H
j
i |∆i,k). The initial
hypothesis probabilities are defined as
P0(Hji ) =
{
1− Pat, for j = 0,
Pat/|Ni| for all j ∈ Ni,
(20)
implying that it is initially considered that each neighbor is
equally likely to be adversarial.
In order to decide the connection that a regular agent
i ∈ R will have with its neighbors at each time instant,
each agent i ∈ R solves a local mixed-integer optimization
problem of the form:
minimize
vi,k,{ui,`|k}k+hp−1`=k
k+hp−1∑
`=k
Ji,`(ui,`|k) + Jvi (vi,k) (21a)
subject to F lci ui,`|k + F
lc
v,ivi,k ≤ f lci,`, (21b)
vi,k ∈ Ci ∪ {1|Ni|}, (21c)
where vi,k = [v
j
i,k]
>
j∈Ni . Here, the cost function J
v
i (vi,k) :
R|Ni| → R penalizes the decision of having a connec-
tion with the neighbors and is expressed as Jvi (vi,k) =
γnat
∑
j∈Ni Pk(H
j
i )(v
j
i,k)
2, where γ ∈ R>0 denotes a
predefined weight and nat denotes the number of attacks that
agent i has received, i.e., the number of time instants at which
∆i,k > bid
max
i . By having nat as a weight, establishing a
connection with a neighbor is penalized more if the number
of received attacks increases. Furthermore, notice that we
penalize vji,k, for each j ∈ Ni, proportionally to Pk(Hji ).
Moreover, (21b) is obtained from (2), (4), (7), (8), (14), and
(15) as well as from the following expressions:
wmaxi,k = max
j∈Ni
(
2pt,maxji v
j
i,k
)
+ dmaxi , (22)
−pt,maxji vji,k ≤ ptji,` ≤ pt,maxji vji,k, ∀j ∈ Ni, (23)
for all ` ∈ {k, . . . , k + hp − 1}, whereas, in the constraint
(21c), Ci = {zj = 1|Ni|− ej , j = 1, 2, . . . , |Ni|}, where ej ,
for all j = 1, 2, . . . |Ni|, are the standard basis vectors of
|Ni|-dimensional Euclidean space. Constraint (21c) implies
that agent i only allows that it is disconnected from at most
one neighbor. Problem (21) is a mixed-integer quadratic
program (MIQP) due to the existence of vi,k.
Proposition 2: Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 4 hold.
Then, Problem (21) has feasible solutions. 2
Proof: The proof is provided in [12].
Finally, suppose that the decision v?i,k = [v
j?
i,k]
>
j∈Ni is the
solution obtained from solving Problem (21). Now, instead
of using (13), each agent i ∈ R computes the worst case
of the disturbance by plugging v?i,k into (22). Thus, in the
robust problem (16), the local constraints (16b) are switched
by (21b) with vi,k = v?i,k, for all i ∈ N .
C. Overall Scheme
The proposed method is summarized in Algorithm 2. Fur-
thermore, we suppose that Assumption 5 holds. Assumption
5 implies that, although there exists a connection between
agents i and j, either of them can block the influence by
closing the connection.
Algorithm 2 Resilient distributed algorithm, for i ∈ R
1: Initialize the hypothesis probabilities according to (20).
2: for k = 1, 2, . . . do
3: Evaluate (18) to detect an attack.
4: Update the probability value of the hypotheses ac-
cording to (19).
5: if Pk(Hji ) = 1, j ∈ Ni, then
6: vj?i,k =
{
0, for Pk(Hji ) = 1,
1, for Pk(Hji ) = 0.
7: Compute u?i,k|k by solving (16), considering
(16b) is formed by (2), (4), (7), (8), (14), (15), (23) with
vi,k = v
?
i,k, and w
max
i,k = d
max
i , using Algorithm 1.
8: else
9: Compute vj?i,k, for all j ∈ Ni, by solving (21)
10: Compute u?i,k|k by solving (16), considering
(16b) is formed by (2), (4), (7), (8), (14), (15), (22) and
(23), with vi,k = v?i,k, using Algorithm 1.
11: end if
12: Apply u?i,k|k and v
?
i,k.
13: end for
Assumption 5: Any agent can temporarily disconnect the
physical link between itself and its neighbors, respecting the
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Fig. 1. The topology of the PG&E 69-bus distribution system and its 8-
agent resulting partition. Blue crosses and squares indicate the distributed
generators and storages, respectively.
TABLE I
PARAMETERS OF THE MICROGRIDS
Parameters Value Unit Agent (i)
xmini , x
max
i , xi,0 40, 70, 55 % all
pchi , p
dh
i , p
G,min
i , p
G,max
i 300, 300, 0,1500 kW all
pt,maxi , p
im,max
i 100, 2000 kW all
ecap,i 1000 kWh all
ai, csti , c
im
i , c
t
i 1, 1, 250, 0.1 - all
cgi 5 - 2, 3, 6, 7
cgi 10 - 1, 4, 5, 8
decision of v?i,k. Two agents, i and j, where (i, j) ∈ E , can
only exchange energy if and only if vj?i,k = v
i?
j,k = 1. 2
The decisions obtained by performing Algorithm 2 are
characterized by the following Proposition 3. In addition,
a sub-optimality certificate of the control inputs obtained by
performing Algorithm 2 is presented in [12].
Proposition 3: Suppose that Assumptions 1-5 hold. If the
regular agents, i.e. all i ∈ R, apply Algorithm 2, then the
obtained decision u?i,k, for all i ∈ R, do not violate the
operational constraints (2)-(9) under an attack that is defined
by Definition 2, for all k ∈ Z≥0. 2
Proof: The proof is provided in [12].
Remark 3: The attack identification and mitigation meth-
ods can be implemented along with any distributed optimiza-
tion algorithm that can solve Problems (11) and (16). 2
IV. CASE STUDY
As a case study, we use the PG&E 69-bus distribution
network with additional distributed generators and energy
storages [5], as depicted in Fig. 1. We follow the partition
given by [5] to divide the network into eight interconnected
microgrids (agents). The parameters of each microgrid are
given in Table I. Furthermore, we consider two types of load
profiles, which are industrial and residential, and assign each
microgrid to one of the profiles randomly. In this case study,
microgrids 2, 6, and 7 are adversarial and the probability of
attacks is set to be 0.3. Furthermore, the prediction horizon
of each agent is hp = 4 steps and we consider one-day
simulation with sampling time of 15 minutes.
TABLE II
TOTAL COST OF THE SYSTEM
Scenario Dist. Attack/Load Cost (Pro- Constraint
Strategy Disturbance portional) Satisfaction
1 Nominal No 1.00 Yes
2 Nominal Yes 1.06 No
3 Alg. 3 Yes 1.91 Yes
4 Alg. 2 Yes 1.18 Yes
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Fig. 2. The evolution of the SoC of agents 1. The black horizontal line
indicates the minimum limit of SoC, xmini .
Algorithm 3 Distributed robust scheme, for i ∈ R
1: for k = 1, 2, . . . do
2: Compute ui,k by solving Problem (16), considering
(16b) is formed by (2), (4), (7)-(9), and (13)-(15), with
Algorithm 1
3: Apply ui,k
4: end for
As shown in Table II, we consider four simulation sce-
narios, in each of which a different distributed strategy is
applied. Table II also shows the overall performance of
the network over the whole simulation time. The proposed
approach achieves a better performance than the robustified
approach while ensuring the satisfaction of the constraints.
As shown in Fig. 2, in Scenario 2, the minimum limit of
the SoC is violated. However, this violation does not occur
in Scenarios 3 and 4. Moreover, Fig. 3 shows how agent 1
detects agent 2 as the adversarial neighbor in Scenario 4.
Once detected, i.e., at k = 8, agent 1 disconnects from agent
2.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
A distributed energy management for interconnected mi-
crogrid systems that is based on dynamic economic dispatch
problem is studied. We analyze the case of having microgrids
that perform an adversarial behavior, i.e., some microgrids do
not comply with the decisions obtained from the distributed
strategy. Furthermore, we propose a robustified formulation
and an attack identification and mitigation method such that
the distributed strategy can deal with such adversaries.
Future work includes extending the proposed approach
such that the stochasticity of the loads is taken into account
explicitly in order to improve the performance and assump-
tions on the number of adversarial neighbors are relaxed.
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Fig. 3. The evolution of the hypothesis probability (top) and the connection
decision (bottom) of agent 1. Note that the decision v?1,k are the same for
k = 8, 9, . . . , 96, since the adversarial neighbor is detected at k = 8.
Furthermore, we will also explore the possibility to improve
the detection strategy as well as the attack mitigation method.
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